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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
The dissent argued that the cause of action pleaded was one
for indemnification and as such was prematurely brought since it
would not accrue until there was an actual- and satisfied - judg-
ment on behalf of the infant against the retailer in the Connecticut
action. It would seem that even though the action be viewed as
one for indemnification it could nonetheless be allowable by simple
analogy to an impleader cause of action, which may be asserted
when a party is or may be liable to the pleading party."'
An impleader cause of action in New York is one for indemn-
ity, and though an indemnity cause of action does not accrue until
actual payment by the third-party plaintiff of any judgment re-
covered against him, impleader traditionally permits assertion of
the indemnity claim on a hypothetical basis (i.e., without it being
certain that there will be anything for which the third-party plain-
tiff would have to be indemnified).
Thus, even though there is no express statutory authorization
for permitting such a premature independent action for idemnifica-
tion, the action may be permitted by a liberal construction of the
CPLR as required by section 104, and a liberal construction of the
pleadings as authorized by section 3026.92 Furthermore, the court
after allowing the complaint, can either stay the proceedings until
the Connecticut action culminates or continue the action, but stay
any judgment until the Connecticut action is completed, thereby
insuring that defendant's rights will not be prejudiced. There was
obviously a jurisdictional problem involved in this case, in that
the other action, pending in Connecticut, was beyond the control
of the New York courts. The case was distinguished on that
ground by another case,9 3 which indicated that an independent in-
demnity claim will not be allowed before its technical accrual when
jurisdictional problems are not present.
Pleading Special Damages-Itemization
Rule 3015(d) of the CPLR requires that special damages be
itemized. Although the rule is new, there is some indication that
it merely codifies the existing case law which recognizes a distinc-
tion between general damages94 which need not be pleaded with
91 CPLR § 1007.
92 Section 3026 provides: "Pleadings shall be liberally construed. Defects
shall be ignored if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced." Ulti-
mately, the significance of the instant case lies not so much. in the con-
struction it has given hypothetical pleadings, but rather in the further
indication that the first department stands ready to construe pleadings liberally
in order to allow a plaintiff with an honest claim his day in court.
93 Morey v. Sealright Co., 247 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
94 General damages are such as are naturally presumed to follow from
the injuries alleged. 4 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES § 1261 (9th ed. 1912).
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particularity and special damages95 which must be specifically stated.
It probably goes further, however, in its specific requirement of
itemization.
In most actions, including negligence, breach of contract or
libel per se, special damages are not a necessary element to the
cause of action. Obviously, therefore, a complaint in such an action
is not subject to a motion to dismiss under rule 3211(a) (7) for
omission of special damages. Rather, the pleading party will be
prevented from proving special damages unless he amends his
complaint. 96
However, in some cases special damages are an integral part
of the cause of action, and a complaint which fails to allege such
damages will be insufficient and subject to a motion for dismissal
for failure to state a cause of action. Thus, in Hecht v. Air Reduc-
tion Co.,9 7 a complaint in prima facie tort pleaded only general
damages and, hence, the complaint was dismissed. Similarly, in
Cowan v. Time, Inc.,98 the court held a complaint in a libel action
(which was not libel per se) 99 insufficient because it failed to
allege special damages.' 00
The question has arisen in recent years of whether or not
special damages must be pleaded in an action for intentional harm
falling outside the categories of the conventional or traditional
torts. The first department has indicated that a failure to plead
special damages in these actions will subject them to a motion to
dismiss.1° 1 On the other hand, the second department has held
that every action for intentional harm falling outside the conven-
tional tort area does not have to be denominated a prima facie tort
95 Special damages are not presumed to follow from the injuries alleged
and would surprise the defendant if asserted at trial for the first time.
Comment, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 70, 71 (1923).96 Kurak v. Traiche, 226 N.Y. 266, 123 N.E. 377 (1919).
9741 Misc. 2d 463, 245 N.Y.S2d 935 (Sup. Ct. 1963); accord, Gillis v.
Georgas, 225 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Franklin v. Aware, Inc., 3
Misc. 2d 833, 155 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 703,
160 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1st Dep't 1957).
9841 Misc. 2d 198, 245 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 1963); accord, Pappas
v. Brink, 20 App. Div. 2d 613, 245 N.Y.S.2d 441 (3d Dep't 1963); Tollfsen
Sales Corp. v. General Slag Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d 713, 205 N.Y.S.2d 925
(2d Dep't 1960). "
99 The same rule is applicable to a slander which is not a slander per se.
Weiss v. Nippe, 5 App. Div. 2d 789, 170 N.Y.S.2d 642 (2d Dep't 1958);
Blens Chems. Inc. v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 197 Misc. 1066, 96 N.Y.S.2d
47 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
100 If the action is for a public nuisance the complaint must show that the
plaintiff has suffered some special damages different from those common to
all citizens. 4 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE § 106
(1953).
101 Zausner v. Fotochrome, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 649, 235 N.Y.S.2d 698
(1st Dep't 1962).
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(which would require the pleading of special damages). 102 Thus,
the intentional infliction of serious mental distress without physical
impact is actionable per se without the necessity of pleading special
damages.103
Where special damages are an integral element of the cause
of action, the courts require considerable particularity, especially in
the libel and slander cases. Thus, allegations such as those pleaded
in Cowan ' 0 4 that the pleader had suffered special damages, with
no attempt at itemization, will be deemed a pleading of general
damages. Where the special damages supporting the cause of
action are the loss of customers, as in Hecht, the specific cus-
tomers lost must be named. 10 5 Furthermore, even where the
plaintiff names specific customers who have been lost, the loss con-
stituting special damages, the court may characterize the damages
as too speculative and dismiss the complaint. 106
The early CPLR cases indicate that under rule 3015(d), the
courts may require considerable specificity in the pleading of special
damages in all actions where they are sought. In view of the re-
tention of the bill of particulars under the CPLR, such a practice
would be lamentable. 10
7
Bill of Particulars -Broad Interpretation of Rule 3042
The function of a bill of particulars is to amplify the pleading,
limit the proof, and prevent surprise at the trial.'0 s When the
02 Halio v. Laurie, 15 App. Div. 2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't
1961).
103 Ibid.
104 41 Misc. 2d 198, 245 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 1963); accord, Leather
Dev. Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 761, 224 N.Y.S.2d
513 (2d Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 909, 188 N.E.2d 270, 237 N.Y.S.2d
1007 (1963).
10 Reporters' Ass'n of America v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n,
186 N.Y. 437, 79 N.E. 710 (1906); Henkin v. News Syndicate Co., 27 Misc.
2d 987, 210 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. C. 1960).
1O6 Trachtenberg Bros. v. Henrietta Steins, Inc., 64 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
107The current federal practice rules do not provide for a bill of
particulars since its purposes could be adequately served by a motion to
make more definite, expanded machinery of discovery, and the pretrial
conference. 2 MooRz, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 1217-20 (2d ed. 1948). In ac-
cordance with the federal practice the First and Final Reports of the
Advisory Committee omitted any provision for the bill of particulars. How-
ever, the change was rejected by the Codes Committee and the bill of
particulars is retained in the CPLR. See 38 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 190,
215 n.54 (1963).
108 Solomon v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 1017, 174 N.Y.S.2d
85 (2d Dep't 1958); Runals v. Niagara Univ., 16 Misc. 2d 853, 185 N.Y.S.2d
315 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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